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1 Introduction
The fishing opportunities of the European Union (EU)1 vary annually, mainly in
response to biological considerations. To ensure the greatest possible stability, for
over 30 years the allocation of EU fishing opportunities to its Member States (MSs)
has been based on a predictable share of the stocks for each MS, known as relative
stability (RS).
In December 2013, Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament
and the Council on the Common Fisheries Policy was adopted.2 The new regulation
keeps RS as a criterion for allocating fishing opportunities to MS and also bans
discards, which are catches returned to the sea.3 Implementing the discard ban is a
major challenge for mixed fisheries in which more than one species is present and
where different species are likely to be caught in the same fishing operation,4 e.g.,
cod, haddock, whiting, and saithe in Northwest Atlantic waters.
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1For easier reading we shall refer to European Union (EU). But for EU we also mean the European
Economic Community (EEC, 1958–1993) and the European Community (EC, 1993–2009). The
EEC came into being in 1958. With the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union in
November 1993, the EEC became the EC. And with the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty in
December 2009, the EU replaced and succeeded the EC.
2Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December
2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and
(EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004
and Council Decision 2004/585/EC. OJ 2013 L 354/22–61.
3Definition of discards: article 4.1.10; ibid.
4Definition of mixed fisheries: article 4.1.36; ibid.
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The aim of this paper is to examine the compromise between RS and the
discard ban.
2 Origin and Enshrining of Relative Stability
The origin and evolution of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is closely linked to
the evolution of international fisheries law (in particular, the creation of the
exclusive economic zone)5 and the enlargement of the EU (mainly the first and
third extension, which included the major European fishing states). Knowledge of
both processes is also essential for understanding the rationale behind and the
resulting form of RS.
The first EU fisheries legislation, which among other things established the
“equal access principle,” was adopted at the beginning of the 1970s as a preliminary
step for the negotiations that would result in the first enlargement of the EU,6
involving the major fishing states of the United Kingdom (UK), Ireland, Denmark
(Danish accession included Greenland but not the Faroe Islands),7 and Norway,
although the latter did not finally join. RS emerges shortly after, in connection with
the outcome of the accession negotiations that enabled that first enlargement. But it
is also closely linked to two other factors: the establishment of the exclusive
economic zone and the third enlargement of the EU. In relation to the first factor
we must recall how, in reaction to certain non-EU countries asserting jurisdiction
5See Rey Aneiros (2001) and Sobrino Heredia (2003).
6The EU has had competence to adopt legislation on fisheries from the outset (EEC Treaty, 1957),
but fishing was not a priority for MSs then (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and
Luxembourg). Moreover, fishing mostly took place in what were then waters of the high seas. The
first step was taken in 1966, with a report from the Commission. In 1968, three draft regulations
appeared that eventually led to the adoption in 1970 of two regulations—Council Regulations
(EEC) Nos 2141/70 and 2142/70—which, among other things, introduced the “equal access
principle”. In accordance with this principle the fishing regulation applied by each MS in its
maritime waters—waters under its sovereignty or within its jurisdiction—must not lead to
differences in the treatment of other MSs. Churchill and Owen (2010), pp. 4–6, state that MSs
wanted an acquis for fisheries before starting negotiations with the four candidate states and, in
fact, the two regulations cited were adopted the day before formal negotiations started with these
states.
7Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (1972); OJ 1972 L 73; MSs of
the EU since 1 January 1973. Both Greenland and the Faroe Islands are part of Denmark, but when
Denmark joined the EU in 1973, the Faroe Islands decided to remain outside precisely because of
fishing: “the Faroese have not found it their interest to become subject to the Common Fisheries
Policy” (The Government of the Faroe Islands, http://www.government.fo/foreign-relations/mis
sions-of-the-faroe-islands-abroad/the-mission-of-the-faroes-to-the-european-union/the-faroe-
islands-and-the-european-union/). The Faroe Islands is like a third country with respect to the
EU. As for Greenland, it joined the EU in 1973 as part of Denmark but withdrew from it in 1985 as
result of a referendum held in 1982. Since then, Greenland is part of the OCT (Overseas Countries
and Territories; articles 198–204 TFEU).
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over their waters out to 200 miles, the EU adopted very similar fishing areas from
1977.8 Moreover, the EU took responsibility for managing fishing rights in these
new waters and also the fishing rights of EU vessels in the waters of third states.
With regard to the second factor, the negotiations concerning what would become
the third enlargement of the EU involved states with major fishing interests such as
Spain and Portugal.9 After the first enlargement, the UK and Ireland were by far the
largest EU fishing powers,10 a position that would later be occupied by Spain,
although it, like Portugal, did not have great resources in its waters. Against this
backdrop, most MSs wanted to have a European system of fisheries management
established before starting negotiations with these two countries.11
2.1 Origin of Relative Stability
In November 1976, the Council adopted the “Hague Resolution,” which deals with
the external aspects (affirmation of the competence of the EU to negotiate with third
countries)12 as well as internal aspects (affirmation of competence of the EU for the
8Joint action by MSs concerning the waters of the North Sea and North Atlantic. For the evolution
of the EU position, and that of its members, on the establishment of the exclusive economic zone
within the framework of the III United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973–1982), see
Treves (1976).
9Portugal submitted a formal application for membership in the EU on March 28, 1977. Spain did
the same 4 months later, on 28 July 1977. With regard to Spain, the letters exchanged in July 1977
between the Spanish Prime Minister and the Chairman of the European Communities on Spain’s
request to start negotiating its integration can be found in Revista de Instituciones Europeas
4 (1977) 1031–1036. The negotiations culminated in 1985 in the Treaty of Accession of Spain
and Portugal (1985); OJ 1985 L 302. Spain and Portugal have been MSs of the EU since
1 January 1986.
10In 1981, when the EU was formed by 10 countries, almost 90% of EU resources were captured
by the UK (64%) and Ireland (25%); see Lostado i Bojo (1985), p. 41.
11As stated by Churchill and Owen (2010), pp. 11–14, Spain and Portugal had large fleets (the
Spanish fleet was nearly ¾ the size of the entire EU fleet, at the time composed by ten MSs), and
the waters under the jurisdiction of these two states did not have many resources because their
continental shelves—not in the legal but the geological sense—are narrow, and waters located on
the continental shelves are the richest in fishery resources. The Commission then spoke of an
“imbalance in the fisheries sector between the tonnage of the Spanish fleet and the fishing zones
available to Spain”; European Commission, “Opinion on Spain’s application for membership”,
sent to the Council by the Commission on 29 November 1978; available at Bulletin of the
European Communities, Supplement 9/78 (1978) 16. On the other hand, Portugal and Spain had
sufficient fisheries access agreements with third countries with which the EC had no agreements;
see Sobrino Heredia (1990).
12Council Resolution of 3 November 1976 on certain external aspects of the creation of a 200-mile
fishing zone in the Community with effect from 1 January 1977; OJ 1981 C 105/1.
The Common Fisheries Policy: A Difficult Compromise Between Relative. . . 25
adoption of conservation measures in EU waters)13 that result from the creation, in
1977, of the 200-mile fishing zone. In this resolution, which was published late14 and
incomplete,15 the Council states that the CFPmust take into account the vital needs of
regions where local populations depend greatly on fishing and related industries.
Known as the “Hague Preferences,” this provision is specifically directed towards
Ireland and northern parts of the UK.16 Despite its open wording, these “preferences”
are a recognition that must be understood in the context of the negotiations with the
UK and Ireland. Therefore, they cannot be automatically extended to other areas with
similar needs; it became clear during the subsequent accession of new states.
The full implementation of the Hague Resolution via a specific distribution
among MSs required years of difficult negotiations.17 Finally, in 1983, the Council
adopted a regulation18 and, based on it, made the first allocation among the MSs19
13Annex VI to the Hague Resolution of 3 November 1976; text reproduced in Opinion of Advocate
General Reischl delivered on 11 September 1979, France v UK, 141/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:202,
p. 2945. Regarding EU fishing regime and third states, see Del Vecchio (1982) and Meseguer
Sa´nchez (1981).
14Not published until 1981 (OJ 1981 C 105/1). In 2001, the Advocate General Alber drew attention
to its late and incomplete publication; see Opinion of Advocate General Alber delivered on
13 November 2001, Spain v Council, joined cases C-61/96, C-132/97, C-45/98, C-27/99, C-81/
00 and C-22/01, ECLI:EU:C:2001:602, footnote 7.
15The Hague Resolution had eight annexes. However, in the Official Journal of the European Union
(OJ) only Annex I, on the external aspects, was published. In 1998 the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) drew attention to this incompleteness. See Judgment of the Court of 19 February 1998,
NIFPO and Northern Ireland Fishermen’s Federation v Department of Agriculture for Northern
Ireland, C-4/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:67, paragraph 5. The Advocate General in this same case noted that
the explanation given by the Council to justify this defect was that some of its annexes contained
confidential material regarding instructions given by the Council to the Commission concerning future
negotiations by the EU with non-member countries and international organisations (see Opinion of
Advocate General La Pergola issued on 30 September 1997, case C-4/96, cit., ECLI:EU:C:1997:444,
point 7). In that judgment, the CJEU reproduces the text of Annex VII (see the judgment in case C-4/
96, cit., paragraph 4). And many years before, the Advocate General Reischl had reproduced the text
of Annex VI (see Opinion in case C-141/78, cit., p. 2945).
16“(. . ..) the expression ‘northern parts of the United Kingdom’ for the purposes of the Hague
Preferences comprises Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man, and that part of England
between the ports of Bridling- ton and Berwick”; Opinion in case C-4/96, cit., footnote 9.
17See Holden (1985), point 6 “Allocation Between Member States of the EEC”. Holden was at that
moment Directorate General for Fisheries Commission of the European Communities.
18Council Regulation (EEC) No 170/83 of 25 January 1983 establishing a Community system for
the conservation and management of fishery resources; OJ 1983 L 24/1–13. This regulation
establishes that the volume of the catches available to the EU must be shared across the MSs in
a manner which assures each MS relative stability in fishing activities for each of the stocks
considered (art. 4.1) with the notion of relative stability understood in accordance with the Hague
Preferences (recitals 6–7).
19Council Regulation (EEC) No 172/83 of 25 January 1983 fixing for certain fish stocks and
groups of fish stocks occurring in the Community’s fishing zone, total allowable catches for 1982,
the share of these catches available to the Community, the allocation of that share between the
Member States and the conditions under which the total allowable catches may be fished; OJ 1983
L 24/30–67.
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stating that three criteria were considered for doing this: the traditional fishing
activities, the specific needs of areas particularly dependent on fishing and its
dependent industries (the Hague Preferences), and the loss of fishing potential in
the waters of third countries.20 With regard to the Hague Preferences for Ireland,
Northern Britain, and Greenland (the latter until it left the EU in 1985), Ireland, the
UK, and Denmark were assured that their fishing opportunities for certain species
would reach a minimum threshold, on the understanding that this threshold would
be in absolute terms and not a percentage. As noted above, these preferences were
not the result of an objective study of the special needs of European fishing
territories but the result of a negotiation.21
2.2 Enshrining Relative Stability
This allocation formula laid down in 198322 continues to take place; it appeared in
subsequent reforms (1992, 2002, 2013)23 and is in the current regulation, despite
the proposed amendment put forward by the European Commission’s Green Book
on the reform of the CFP (2009).24
20Ibid. recital 3. These criteria, which were set by the Council in 1980 without further details on
their application or how much weight was to be placed on each criterion (Council declaration of
30 May 1980 on the common fisheries policy, OJ 1980 C 158/2) were interpreted by the
Commission, which presented a mathematical model that took into account the three criteria and
served as a starting point for the allocation of quotas, stock by stock. As Holden (1985) states, the
Commission interpreted what should be understood by traditional fishing activities (“average
catches in the period 1973–78, less industrial by-catches beyond permitted limits and human
consumption species caught directly for reduction to meal and oil”), the specific needs of areas
particularly dependent on fishing and its dependent industries (“For Greenland: a major share of
the catch possibilities in Greenland waters; For Ireland: doubling of the 1975 catches by 1978; For
north Britain: maintaining a minimum catch possibility equal to the landings in 1975 by vessels
less than 24 m long at ports in northern Ireland, Scotland and along the east coast of England as far
south as Bridlington”), and the loss of fishing potential in the waters of third countries (“the
difference between what a Member State is actually allowed to catch and what it would have
caught if there had been no extension to 200-mile limits. What it would have caught is calculated
as its average percentage share of the particular stock for the period 1973–76 multiplied by the
TAC, if known, or the estimated TAC, otherwise”).
21Penas Lado (2016), p. 28, points out that, in exchange for this guarantee, the UK and Ireland
agreed to lower TACs—understood as the percentage applied in the context of the RS—than they
wanted.
22Allocation formula laid down in Regulation 172/83, cit.
23Council Regulation (EEC) No 3760/92 of 20 December 1992 establishing a Community system
for fisheries and aquaculture; OJ 1992 L 389/1–14; see recitals 12–14. Council Regulation
(EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of
fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy; OJ 2002 L 358/59–80; see recitals 16–18.
Regulation 1380/2013, cit., see recitals 35–37.
24European Commission,Green Paper of 22 April 2009—Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy,
COM(2009) 163 final; Green Paper 2009, hereinafter. See point 5.3.
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However, it has been completed as a result of new accessions and distribution of
more species. On the one hand, since 1983 new states have acceded to the EU,
including major fishing nations such as Spain and Portugal. When joining the EU,
each new state accepts the acquis communautaire and therefore also RS, not as an
underlying principle to ensure a distribution that tends to provide stability but as the
specific percentages determined in 1983.25 The incorporation of a new state does
not entitle that state to require a review of the percentages set when it was not part
of the EU. With regard to these species, the new MS only gets what negotiates in its
accession treaty.26 On the other hand, in the distribution of 1983, not all species
from all areas were included, and over time it has been necessary to offer new
fishing opportunities. This decision is made by the Council, taking into account the
“interests” of the states,27 a notion that does not necessarily take into account, if
any, the historical catches of the MSs for that stock zone.28
In brief, the current allocation percentages are established as follows: first, by
taking into account the percentages established in 1983, if necessary with the
application of the Hague Preferences,29 e.g., the allocation of cod and whiting quotas
in ICES division VIIa (Irish Sea);30 second, based on the percentages set forth in the
Acts of Accession of states that adhered after 1983, e.g., the allocation of anchovy
quotas in ICES division VIII (Bay of Biscay);31 and third, in accordance with the
25As stated expressly by the CJEU. Judgment of the Court of 30 March 2006, Spain v Council,
C-87/03 and C-100/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:207, paragraphs 28–29.
26For new states, the application of RS is not based on the three criteria taken into account in the
regulations of 1983; rather, it is only based on historical catches. Penas Lado (2016), p. 27.
27Art. 16.1 of Regulation 1380/2013: “. . .The interests of each Member State shall be taken into
account when new fishing opportunities are allocated”. And in the same sense, formerly, the
regulations from 1992 and 2002; see article 8.4.iii) of Regulation 3760/92, and article 20.2 of
Regulation 2371/2002.
28As stated expressly by the CJEU, the allocation of new fishing opportunities among MSs
requires the assessment of a complex economic situation for which the Council enjoys a wide
discretionary power (Judgments in cases C-87/03 and C-100/03, cit., paragraph 38). That is not
always harmonious process.
29Penas Lado (2016), p. 348, points out that the Hague Preferences have been applied continuously
although not always harmoniously owing to the resistance of negatively affected MSs. This author
explains that its application is not automatic but established within a negotiating framework, and
often only 50% is applied (i.e., the average between what the UK and/or Ireland would receive by
applying RS and what they would obtain under the Hague Preferences).
30The distribution of these quotas and the application of the Hague Preferences were specifically
addressed in case C-4/96. Judgment of case C-4/96, cit., paragraph 18: “Under that mechanism,
Ireland and the United Kingdom are granted annual quotas calculated on the basis of the mid-point
between the notional quotas resulting from the application of the 1983 allocation keys alone and
the notional quotas corresponding to their Hague Preferences”.
31The Act concerning the conditions of accession of Spain (cit., arts. 161.1.f and 162) established
that 90% of the quota for anchovy in the Bay of Biscay correspond to Spain and the remaining 10%
to France. For example, the TAC of 22,500 tonnes for the EU in the Gulf of Biscay in 2016 is
distributed as follows: 22,500 tonnes for Spain and 2500 for France; Council Regulation
(EU) 2016/72 of 22 January 2016, OJ 2016 L 22/42.
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percentages for new fishing opportunities, e.g., the angler fish quota in ICES division
IV (Norwegian waters), which was allocated for the first time in 2005.32
The resulting percentages of these three processes constitute the RS
distribution key.
3 The Nature of Relative Stability
RS is a criterion of distribution that, as its name suggests, aims to ensure the greatest
possible stability. Given the constraints surrounding the setting of quotas, it is a
relative stability as opposed to an absolute stability. Furthermore, its implementa-
tion as a distribution key does not guarantee the relative stability of the situation
prior to its implementation but a future relative stability (1).
The mechanisms for allowing flexibility in this distribution key exclude fishing
communities as direct beneficiaries, and RS is established as a guarantee of stability
only for states (2). RS is a mandatory distribution key, albeit one susceptible to
modification (3).
3.1 Future Predictability
Due to the difficult situation in the fisheries sector (structural problems of great
socioeconomic impact), from the beginning of the CFP it was decided that this area
would not be subject to the rules governing the single market in the EU for
economic activities.33
To ensure the maximum stability, it was agreed that the EU itself would
distribute the fishing opportunities among states (leaving the distribution of national
quotas among fishing operators to each state, according to the criteria deemed
appropriate). It was also decided that such a distribution would be the same every
year, not in absolute terms but at least in relative terms. The distribution cannot be
the same in absolute terms because the EU fishing opportunities (in EU waters, in
waters subject to the sovereignty or jurisdiction of third countries, and in
32This allocation took place with the Council Regulation (EC) No 27/2005 of 22 December 2004,
OJ 2005 L 12/1. Its character of “new fishing opportunity” was confirmed by the CJEU in Case C
141/05; 5; Judgment of the Court of 8 November 2007, Spain v Council, C-141/05, ECLI:EU:
C:2007:653, paragraph 90.
33See European Commission, Green Paper on the future of the Common Fisheries Policy, COM
(2001) 135 final; Green Paper 2001, hereinafter; section 5.1.4.1. This exception to the single
market has received great criticism from many quarters (authors, authorities, etc.). For instance, by
a region highly dependent on fishing, Galicia (Spain); see Xunta de Galicia, Declaration by the
Autonomous Government (Xunta) of Galicia on the Principles of the European Union in the Future
Common Fisheries Policy (Santiago de Compostela: Xunta de Galicia, 2002).
The Common Fisheries Policy: A Difficult Compromise Between Relative. . . 29
international waters) are not the same every year. It varies depending on the
biological status of fisheries and on the outcome of agreements with third parties.
Furthermore, its implementation as a distribution key does not guarantee the relative
stability of the situation prior to its implementation—not for those who were MSs in
1983 and not for new states that have joined since then. What is guaranteed is the
stability of the original terms agreed upon, which amounts to a future stability.
In this respect, the Hague Preferences deserve special mention, although some
states—such as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and France—are
manifestly against them. The EU regulation refers to the Hague Preferences as an
element that integrates RS. It was like this at the beginning (1983)34 and has
continued to be so in subsequent regulations (1992, 2002, 2013).35 The Hague
Preferences guarantee preferential treatment to Ireland and the UK for certain
fisheries. When the application of RS would result in total allowable catches
(TACs) for the UK and Ireland in certain fisheries below the minimum originally
agreed upon, these states may request the application of the Hague Preferences.
This system, which is applied by the Council, results in higher TACs for Ireland and
the UK than they would otherwise receive. Inevitably, this occurs at the expense of
other states that have a share in the fisheries in question.36
3.2 The States as Beneficiaries of Relative Stability
RS is a guarantee, a guarantee of stability. But it is a guarantee for states,37 not a
guarantee for the economic actors involved in fishing. For this reason, the situation
of the latter is irrelevant from a legal point of view.
Despite being presented as a criterion for safeguarding the interests of the fishing
industry and fishing communities,38 the fact is, as the European Commission
warned in 2009, RS no longer provides a guarantee that fishing rights remain
34Regulation 170/83, cit., recitals 35–37.
35Regulation 3760/92, cit., recitals 12–14. Regulation 2371/2002, cit., recitals 16–18. Regulation
1380/2013, cit., recitals 35–37.
36See Parliamentary questions (European Parliament); Answer given by the Commission to the
written question E-0139/08, 13 March 2008.
37“The principle of relative stability has, since 1983, provided assurances to the Member States
with regard to the share of quotas, thus avoiding annual repetitions of a political debate on the
allocation key, which would have made the decision-making on TACs even more complicated...”
Green Paper 2001, cit.; section 5.1.4.1.
38According to the current regulation: “35. In view of the precarious economic state of the fishing
industry and the dependence of certain coastal communities on fishing, it is necessary to ensure the
relative stability of fishing activities by allocating fishing opportunities among Member States,
based on a predictable share of the stocks for each Member State. 36. Such relative stability of
fishing activities (. . .) should safeguard and take full account of the particular needs of regions
where local communities are especially dependent on fisheries and related activities (. . .)”;
Regulation 1380/2013, cit., recitals 35–36.
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with their fishing communities. RS itself has promoted a series of practices that has
led to RS no longer providing this guarantee. This, along with other factors, has
contributed to a current discrepancy between the quotas allocated to MSs and the
actual needs and uses of their fleets.39 However, this amounts to a merely political
argument, not a legal one.
This argument would stand as justification for changing the law (through the
appropriate legislative procedure). Indeed, in the debate prior to the last reform, the
Commission used it to propose amendments.40 However, as these amendments did
not prosper, this argument does not seem to be considered valid legal grounds for
bringing an action before the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). In this regard, we
must also remember that, in a case of a violation of RS, the CJEU does not
recognize the right of fishing operators to be compensated for any damage that
such a violation may cause to them.41
3.3 Allocation Formula Contained in the Derived Legislation
The CJEU has had to rule on RS42 and in doing so uses the term “principle,”43
which is also used by many authors. However, when identifying its contents, the
CJEU qualifies RS as a “fixed percentage” and as an “allocation formula originally
laid down [that] will continue to apply as long as an amending regulation has not
been adopted.”44
While we do not intend here to examine, or reflect upon, the principles of EU
law,45 we must keep in mind the following: like international and national laws, EU
law has an unwritten component consisting of general principles that take prece-
dence not over primary law but over secondary law. Some of these principles are
rooted in principles of international law or national law (e.g., the presumption of
39Green Paper 2009, cit., section 5.3.
40Ibid.
41“88. (. . .) the principle of relative stability concerns only relations between Member States, it
cannot confer individual rights upon private parties, the infringement of which would give rise to a
right to compensation (. . .). 89. (. . .) The principle of relative stability does not therefore confer on
fishermen any guarantee that they can catch a fixed quantity of fish, since the requirement of
relative stability must be understood as meaning merely maintenance of a right to a fixed
percentage for each Member State in that distribution”. Judgment of the Court of First Instance
of 19 October 2005, Cofradía de pescadores de “San Pedro” de Bermeo and Others v Council,
T-415/03; ECLI:EU:T:2005:365; paragraphs 88–89.
42Franckx (2012) clearly identifies RS as one of the main of the many fishery issues that the CJEU
has had to deal with. For more on this case law, see also: Le Bihan (2003), Sobrido-Prieto (2013),
and Sobrino Heredia and Rey Aneiros (1997).
43E.g., Judgment in case C-141/05, cit., paragraphs 11, 44, 48, 62, 85, 87.
44Ibid., paragraph 86.
45See Sobrino Heredia (2009).
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innocence),46 while others are specific principles of EU law (e.g., the principle of
institutional balance).47 These principles have been articulated by the CJEU
through an interpretive analysis extracted from written EU law and also interna-
tional law and the national law of the MSs. The CJEU does not create these
principles but extracts them from these sources.
Alongside these general principles, each area of the EU also has its peculiarities.
In fisheries management, for example, certain principles such as good governance48
and the precautionary principle49 are particularly important. RS, however, is not
presented as a principle. The legislative acts that give substance to RS qualify it as a
“notion”50 or, in its current regulation, as a “concept.”51
What is noteworthy is its specific and binding nature and the possibilities for
change, flexibility, and even repeal. RS is not a guiding principle to ensure a
distribution that tends to provide stability but specific percentages imposed as
binding that form part of the acquis communautaire. Even for new fishing oppor-
tunities, the decision made by the Council is not necessarily based on stability.52
RS is a distribution key negotiated between MSs that is laid down in the
secondary legislation of the EU.
The implementation of RS as percentages is the result of negotiation between the
MSs. Perhaps the best example of this negotiation is the Hague Preferences.
Although presented as a safeguard for the benefit of the most vulnerable regions,
in practice they are not applied in benefit of any region that may be classified as
such (regions where the local populations are especially dependent on fisheries and
related activities) but only in the case of Ireland and the UK. This negotiating
46E.g. Judgment of the Court of 21 January 2016, “Eturas” UAB and Others v Lietuvos
Respublikos konkurencijos taryba, C-74/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:42, paragraph 38.
47E.g. Judgment of the Court of 6 October 2015, Council v Commission, C-73/14, ECLI:EU:
C:2015:663, paragraph 61.
48“It is important for the management of the CFP to be guided by principles of good governance.
Those principles include decision-making based on best available scientific advice, broad stake-
holder involvement and a long-term perspective. The successful management of the CFP also
depends on a clear definition of responsibilities at Union, regional, national and local levels and on
the mutual compatibility of the measures taken and their consistency with other Union policies”,
Regulation 1380/2013, cit., recital 14.
49“Sustainable exploitation of marine biological resources should be based on the precautionary
approach, which derives from the precautionary principle referred to in the first subparagraph of
Article 191(2) of the Treaty, taking into account available scientific data”, Regulation (EU) No
1380/2013, cit., recital 10. See Proelss and Houghton (2012). And for a general reference about the
precautionary principle in the EU see: European Commission, Communication from the Commis-
sion on the precautionary principle, COM (2000) 0001.
50Regulation 170/83, cit., recital 7; Regulation 3760/92 cit., recital 14; Regulation 2371/2002, cit.,
recital 37.
51Regulation 1380/2013, cit., recital 37.
52This was expressly stated by the CJEU. Judgment in case C-141/05, cit., paragraph 87.
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dimension is not hidden by the benefited parties. To the contrary, both Ireland53 and
the UK54 appeal to it, and the MSs most strongly opposing the Hague Preferences
because they are directly affected do not allege that the beneficiary regions are not
dependent on fisheries or that there are other dependent regions that are left out.
Rather, they argue that the Hague Preferences have altered the percentages nego-
tiated in 1983.55
Although RS is a distribution key negotiated between the MSs of the EU, it does
not operate as an agreement between parties imposed as mandatory according to
international law but separate from EU law. The binding nature of RS does not
derive from the pacta sunt servanda principle. Instead, it finds its legal basis in the
secondary EU legislation, currently Regulation 1380/2013. So, as stated by the
CJEU, RS will continue to apply until an amending regulation is adopted.56 RS is an
allocation that can be modified or repealed by an act of legislation. In this regard, as
discussed above, during the last reform that culminated in Regulation 1380/2013,
the Commission proposed amendments that finally did not come to fruition.
4 The Discard Ban
One of the negative effects of RS is the discards, which are catches returned to the
sea (1). The new regulation imposes a progressive ban on discards but maintains RS
as the distribution key for national quotas (2). The coexistence of both RS and the
discard ban is a challenge for the first, not in its formal dimension as a quota
allocation but in its substantive content on the utilization of the allocated quotas (3).
53During the debate prior to the latest reform of the CFP in 2010, Ireland stated that the Hague
Preferences in Annex VII of the Hague Resolution were the counterpart to a concession that
Ireland had made: access to their exclusive economic zone. It even claimed that it was “not
possible to re-open or diminish the principles set out in Annex VII of the Hague Resolution
without re-opening the whole issue of access within the 200 mile Exclusive Fisheries Zone”.
Government of Ireland, Ireland’s response to the Commission’s Green Paper on the Reform of the
Common Fisheries Policy (Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 2010) 16; http://ec.
europa.eu/fisheries/reform/docs/ireland_en.pdf.
54In the “Transcript of Minister for Europe David Lidington comments to media on the prospects
of EU membership for a newly independent Scotland” (extracts from the interviews given to ITV
Borders and BBC Scotland on 17 January 2014) published on the British government’s website,
Lidington warns: “if we look at the UK in the EU, we have got a good deal for Scotland. In terms of
fisheries, the Shetland box, the Hague preferences, that wouldn’t be guaranteed if Scotland walked
away from the UK”; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prospects-of-eu-membership-for-a-
newly-independent-scotland.
55These MSs have stated this on various occasions. For example, see the Statements published in
the minutes of the Council, January 2008: “Statement by Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the
Netherlands concerning the Hague Preferences” (p. 13) and “Statement by the French
delegation. . .2. Implementation of the Hague Preferences” (p. 14); available at http://data.
consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12272-2008-INIT/en/pdf.
56E.g., Judgment in case C-141/05, cit., paragraph 86.
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4.1 Relative Stability and Discards
The impact of discarding varies by species: some have low survivability when discarded
(e.g., cod) whereas others may have higher survival rates (e.g., crustaceans).57 And
discards have positive ecological effects to the extent that discarded fish is food for a
range of scavenging species.58 However, discards are generally a negative practice
entailing a massive waste of resources (human and animal food, potential income). In
addition, it is probably the single most important reason for the poor quality of fisheries-
dependent data that could be used to improve stock assessments.59
The nonrecording of discards makes it difficult to know the exact number of
discards at a global or regional level, although we know it has reached worrying
levels.60 In the EU, it varies from area to area, but it can be very high.61
The practice of discarding occurs for various reasons, which can be divided into
two categories.62 First, discards occur for commercial reasons: wrong sex (where
gender is important from a processing and marketing point of view); damaged fish,
fish incompatible with the rest of the catch (slime or abrasion could cause damage
to target species); inedible fish, rapidly spoiling fish; lack of space on board and
high grading (take the best and leave the rest, often related to size). Second, discards
also occur due to legal prohibitions: prohibited size, prohibited season, prohibited
57Andersen et al. (2014), p. 2.
58Food subsidies to wildlife as a result of human activity have an important effect on terrestrial and
aquatic ecosystems, and intentional discarding at sea is recognized as one of the major global
subsidies. Heath et al. (2014).
59Wilson and Jacobsen (2009), p. 6.
60In 1994, a study by the FAO—Alverson et al. (1994)—estimated that between 17.9 and 39.5
million tonnes (average, 27.0 million tonnes) of fish were discarded each year in commercial
fisheries. In 2005 other study by the FAO—Kelleher (2005)—estimated that the weighted discard
rate was 8% (proportion of the catch discarded). Based on this discard rate, the average yearly
discards for the 1992–2001 period was estimated to be 7.3 million tonnes. The author warns that
because of the different method used in this estimate, it was not directly comparable with the
previous estimates of 27 million tonnes. In any case, the author states there was evidence to
suggest a substantial reduction in discards in recent years. In geographical terms, the Northeast
Atlantic (1.4 million tonnes), the Northwest Pacific (1.3 million tonnes) and the Western Central
Atlantic (0.8 million tonnes) generated the highest discards.
61In 2011, the Commission created a compilation and review of information on the level of
discarding in different fisheries within the EU. The Commission distinguished three categories:
high discard fisheries (>40%), medium discard fisheries (15–39%), low discard (<15%). In
Table 2 (pp. 11–22), data per zone are shown: Region covered/Target Species/Discard rate/Main
discarded species/Reason for discarding. The region with the highest percentage of discards was
the Southern North Sea, with a discard rate of 71–95%. Although within a region there may be very
different discard practices according to species, for example: North Sea IV (English and Welsh
fleets) had a general discard rate of 31%, but 89% for Dub. European Commission (2011)
Common Fisheries Policy Impact Assessment—EU Discards Annex. See also: Uhlmann
et al. (2013).
62We take as a reference, although simplifying some reasons and grouping them into two
categories, the work of Lucas (1997).
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gear (a quota may be given for the capture of a particular species by a particular
type of gear), prohibited fishing ground (closed for the capture of one species but
open for others), prohibited species (no quota for the particular operator), and
quotas reached (often the reason for high grading). This second category of discard
occurs because the capture cannot be legally brought to market.
In the EU, prior to the current Regulation 1380/2013, it was not prohibited to
discard fish, and discarded fish did not count towards an operator’s quota. In this
context, the national quota allocation system based on RS contributed to discarding,
not because the EU’s total TAC was used up but because the share for a particular
MS was. While the fleet of one MS may not have used up its quota for a species,
another fleet may have done so or may have had no quota at all, in which case this
latter fleet would be forced to discard catches of this species.63 If all quota systems
generate discards, the EU system multiplies discards as each national quota gener-
ates its own discarding constraints.
This situation is in the process of being eradicated as Regulation 1380/2013
imposes a progressive ban on discards. One of the main reasons for this change was
the pressure of public opinion, from both inside and outside of the EU, which had
been sparked by striking images in the media.64
4.2 The Landing Obligation
In accordance with Regulation 1380/2013, the discard ban is being introduced
gradually (between 2015 and 2019) and on a fishery-by-fishery basis.65 The regu-
lation distinguishes between four categories: small pelagic fisheries (e.g., mackerel,
herring, horse mackerel, blue whiting, boarfish, anchovy, argentine, sardine, and
sprat), large pelagic fisheries (e.g., bluefin tuna, swordfish, albacore tuna, bigeye
tuna, blue and white marlin), fisheries for industrial purposes (e.g., capelin, sandeel,
and Norwegian pout), species that define the fisheries (no examples of this category
are given in the regulation). In addition to these categories, the regulation also
describes certain species-area (inter alia fisheries for salmon in the Baltic Sea,
fisheries for hake in the North Sea, etc.). It establishes four time frames that include
these categories and species-areas and sets four deadlines by which the landing
63Green Paper 2009, cit., section 5.3.
64Borges (2015), p. 536, highlights an incident that took place in 2008. A UK trawler (The Prolific)
was filmed by the Norwegian coastguard throwing five tonnes of fish overboard immediately after
leaving Norwegian waters, where discarding is prohibited. This event was widely reported in the
press. See, for example, the Guardian newspaper in its edition of 13/8/2008. Its online version even
provides a video over 4 min long showing the operation in which the Prolific discarded nearly 80%
of its catch. The boat had previously been inspected in Norwegian waters and declared legal,
before crossing into UK waters where it dumped its load; http://www.theguardian.com/environ
ment/2008/aug/13/fishing.endangeredspecies.
65Art. 15, Regulation 1380/2013, cit.
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obligation is to be effective (1 January 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2019). Without going
into the details of which species or species-areas are included in each of these time
frames, it is important to note that the EU discards affect the demersal species more
than the pelagic species,66 which is why the implementation did not start with them.
So far, the Commission has adopted 5þ3 plans. In October 2014, the Commission
adopted five discard plans, applicable from 1 January 2015, for certain pelagic and
industrial fisheries.67 One year later, in October 2015, the Commission adopted three
discard plans, applicable from 1 January 2016, for certain demersal fisheries.68
The discard ban is established as a landing obligation. Catches during fishing
activities in Union waters or by Union fishing vessels in international waters
(waters not subject to EU or third countries’ sovereignty or jurisdiction) must be
brought and retained on board the fishing vessels, recorded, landed, and counted
against any applicable quotas, except when used as live bait.
There are two possible exceptions to this obligation. First, the regulation allows for
fishing operators to continue to discard species that, according to the best available
scientific advice, have a high survival rate when released into the sea.69 For instance,
an exemption from the landing obligation exists for Norway lobster caught in pots,
traps, or creels in ICES division VIa and subarea VII.70 Second, to cater for unwanted
catches that are unavoidable even when all measures for their reduction are taken,
certain de minimis exemptions from the landing obligation may be established.71 For
66E.g. the discard rate in the North Sea has been 30–40% by weight for the main demersal fish species
(cod, haddock,whiting and plaice) since the 1970s; and around 10% for pelagic fish.Heath et al. (2014).
67Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1392/2014 of 20 October 2014 establishing a
discard plan for certain small pelagic fisheries in the Mediterranean Sea; Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) No 1393/2014 of 20 October 2014 establishing a discard plan for certain pelagic
fisheries in north-western waters; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1394/2014 of
20 October 2014 establishing a discard plan for certain pelagic fisheries in south-western waters;
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1395/2014 of 20 October 2014 establishing a discard
plan for certain small pelagic fisheries and fisheries for industrial purposes in the North Sea;
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1396/2014 of 20 October 2014 establishing a discard
plan in the Baltic Sea. OJ 2014 L 370.
68Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2438 of 12 October 2015 establishing a discard
plan for certain demersal fisheries in north-western waters; Commission Delegated Regulation
(EU) 2015/2439 of 12 October 2015 establishing a discard plan for certain demersal fisheries in
south-western waters; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2440 of 22 October 2015
establishing a discard plan for certain demersal fisheries in the North Sea and in Union waters of
ICES Division IIa. OJ 2015 L 336.
69Species for which scientific evidence demonstrates high survival rates, taking into account the
characteristics of the gear, of the fishing practices and of the ecosystem. Regulation 1380/2013,
cit., recital 27, article 15 paragraph 4.b.
70Article 2, Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/2438, cit.
71The de minimis exemption shall apply where scientific evidence indicates that increases in
selectivity are very difficult to achieve; or to avoid disproportionate costs of handling unwanted
catches, for those fishing gears where unwanted catches per fishing gear do not represent more than
a certain percentage, to be established in a plan, of total annual catch of that gear. Regulation 1380/
2013, cit., recital 31, article 15 paragraphs 4.c and 5.c.
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example, it exists a provision that allows to discard up to a maximum of 7% in 2015
and 2016, and 6% in 2017 of albacore tuna for total annual catches in the albacore tuna
directed fisheries using midwater pair trawls (PTM) in ICES sea area VII.72
In addition to these two possible exemptions, which are to be determined in the
corresponding discard plan, fishing operators must discard catches of prohibited
species (e.g., basking shark)73 and, since 2015, also predator-damaged fish.74 These
catches of prohibited species and predator-damaged fish cannot be retained on
board and must be returned into the sea.75
These catches that can (high survivability, de minimis) or must (prohibited
species, predator-damaged fish) be discarded are not counted against the quota,
but they must be documented in the logbook.76
4.3 Use of National Quotas
The EU carries out a stock-by-stock management based on TACs (EU) and quotas
(MSs). And, as we have seen, allocation keys were basically fixed for each stock-
area on an MS basis when they joined the EU. Even if those allocation keys were
adequate when fixed—a matter denied by some—the fact is that, as the Commis-
sion points out, conditions have changed since then due to different factors as, not
intending to be exhaustive, stock development, the evolution of fleets, new fishing
strategies on different stocks, changes in demand for given species, or the evolution
of imports.77 One of the effects of this system is the so-called mini-quotas.78
72Article 3.a, Commission Delegated Regulation 1393/2014, cit.
73Species in respect of which fishing is prohibited and which are identified as such in a Union legal
act adopted in the area of the CFP. Regulation 1380/2013, cit., recital 27, article 15 paragraph 4.a.
74Fish which have been damaged by predators such as fish-eating marine mammals, predatory fish
or birds, can constitute a risk to humans, to pets and to other fish by virtue of pathogens and
bacteria which might be transmitted by such predators. This fish is a new exception to the landing
obligation inserted by Regulation (EU) 2015/812 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
20 may 2015 amending, among others, Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013. JO 2015 L 133, recital
16 and art. 9.a.
75European Commission, “1 January 2015: the landing obligation”, http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/
cfp/fishing_rules/landing-obligation/index_en.htm.
76Ibid.
77European Commission (2011) Impact assessment; Commission staff working paper accompa-
nying the document Commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Common Fisheries Policy; IA 2011, hereinafter. SEC (2011) 891 final, de
13.7.2011; Section 2.1.4.
78During the discussions prior to the last reform of the CFP, Ireland manifested its support for RS
but also proposed a relaxation of it. One of the problems that Ireland pointed out was the mini-
quotas: “(. . .) While these allocations may reflect catch history in the 1970’s, today they are very
small quotas in often distant fisheries. In many cases fleets steam many miles (incurring significant
carbon foot prints) to catch small allocations in fisheries where they may or may not also have
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There are two ways of easing RS. MSs may exchange all or part of the fishing
opportunities allocated to them,79 or they may make use a year-to-year flexibility
mechanism of up to 10% of their permitted landings.80 Outside of these two
options, overfishing is penalized. When the Commission establishes that a MS
exceeded the quotas which have been allocated to it, the Commission shall
operate deductions in the future quotas of that MS by applying a multiplying
factor.81 For this reason, some exchanges of quotas between MSs are actually
regularizations in disguise.82
Quota exchanges take place between MSs83 but not in a fully satisfactory
manner, so quotas sometimes have been underutilized.84 This has been the situation
so far, and in the current period it is expected to worsen as a result of the ban on
discards.
At this point in time, the traditional mechanisms for providing RS flexibility are
still in place and, as we have seen, the landing obligation is in force with some
exemptions. In addition are two further elements: discards are taken into account
when setting quotas for MSs, and a new flexibility mechanism has been introduced.
Indeed, on the one hand, when the landing obligation for a fish stock is introduced,
fishing opportunities will be fixed taking into account the change from fixing fishing
opportunities that reflect landings to fixing fishing opportunities that reflect catches,
given that, for the first and subsequent years, discarding of that stock will no longer
be allowed.85 In other words, in a scenario with discards, the reference is landings
quotas for other stocks caught in mixed fisheries. Given their size it is evident that it is not
commercially viable to catch these quotas; indeed many of them are economically unsound and
should be redistributed to Member States in a position to utilize them (. . .).” Department of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food of the Government of Ireland (2010), Ireland’s Response to the
Commission’s Green Paper on the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, pp. 16–17, section
3.3.1; http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/reform/docs/ireland_en.pdf.
79Regulation 1380/2013, cit., recital 29 and Art. 16.8.
80Ibid., Art. 15.9.
81Article 105, Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009; JO 2009 L 343.
82Commission warned some years ago (IA 2011, cit., Section 2.1.4) that the Commission got close
to 1000 notifications of swaps per year, 50% of which were nearly permanent, the rest were late
year ‘regularisations’ intended to legitimise excessive catches.
83As the Commission informed (ibid.), MSs exchanged more than 10% of their quotas in the
period 2005–2008 on an annual basis. The species with the highest swap volumes were redfish, cod
and hake and some pelagic species like herring, blue whiting, jack mackerel, mackerel, sprat,
anchovy and sandeel.
84The Vessels’ Owners Cooperative of the Spanish Port of Vigo Espa~na (ARVI) conducted a study
on the situation. The study analyzes 20 major species subject to quotas in the EU for the period
2008–2014. The report concludes (pp. 52–53) that the remaining portion of the quota that was not
eventually utilized by MSs amounted to 1 million tonnes (exactly 1,039,549.78 tonnes) over the
period 2008–2014, i.e., an average of 23% (an annual average of roughly 143 thousand tonnes).
These underutilized quotas represented a total value of 1833.7 million euros (based on the guide
prices). ARVI (2016) Update of the TAC and quota system in face of the ban of discards; Spanish-
English bilingual edition, http://www.arvi.org/publicaciones/PuestaTacsCuotasDescartes.pdf.
85Regulation 1380/2013, cit., Art. 16.2.
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(catches less discards), while when discards are prohibited, the reference is the
catches (discounting catches not subject to the landing obligation). On the other
hand, flexibility between species is allowed. Catches of species that are subject to
the landing obligation and that are caught in excess of quotas of the stocks in
question, or catches of species in respect of which the MS has no quota, may be
deducted from the quota of the target species provided that they do not exceed 9%
of the quota of the target species.86 This second possibility—flexibility between
species—has been seen by some as a breach of RS in favor of the autonomy of MSs,
as it allows applying not used-up quotas to other species for which there is no quota,
or for which quotas have been exceeded.87
In summary, RS maintains its flexibility mechanisms (quota swapping and year-
to-year flexibility), the landing obligation is not absolute (with the exemptions of
high survivability, de minimis, prohibited species, and predator-damaged fish), the
fishing opportunities that take into account the effect of discards are expected to
increase, and some flexibility between species will be admitted. Will this be
enough?
The biggest concern is with the so-called choke species, which may even further
reduce quota exchanges. MSs that previously got rid of certain quotas will now
need them to cover the discard ban to prevent that other species strangle the catches
of its target species. The real challenges lie with the demersal species. Although we
will have to wait to see what happens on the fishing grounds, the experience with
pelagic species has not been encouraging. In this case, the choke species have not
stimulated quota exchanges but rather reduced them.88
At this point, it should be remembered that one of the objectives of the CFP is to
increase productivity in fisheries by ensuring the rational development of fisheries
production and the optimum utilization of the factors of production, in particular
labor.89 A notion that must be understood in the light of other objectives, which
include a fair standard of living for the fishing community and supply at reasonable
prices.
This management of resources must also take into account the peculiarities
resulting from structural and natural disparities between the various fishing regions,
86This provision only applies where the stock of the non-target species is within safe biological
limits. Regulation 1380/2013, cit., Art. 15.8.
87E.g. Spanish Government; interview with Carlos Dominguez, at the moment Secretary General
for Fisheries of the Government of Spain; published in March 2013 and reported in various media;
see La Opinion in its edition of 19.03.2013, http://www.laopinioncoruna.es/mar/2013/03/18/car
los-dominguez-plan-descartes-reducira-pesca-gran-sol-tres-meses-ano/703190.html.
88With regard to the issue of choke species and quota swaps, European Commission informs that
stakeholders are suggesting that MSs seem to retain quotas rather than increase swapping under the
newly introduced landing obligation. Commission staff working document accompanying the
document: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council—
Consultation on the fishing opportunities for 2017 under the Common Fisheries Policy; COM
(2016) 396 final, 15.06.2016, p. 10.
89And also by promoting technical progress, but it is not what we want to emphasize now.
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the impact of the fisheries sector on the whole economy, and the need to effect the
appropriate adjustments by degrees.90
As the fisheries sector points out, for years discards were socially and politically
accepted. When this ceased to be the case, the need arose to ban them. Likewise,
there may come a day when the socioeconomic effects of the inability to take
advantage of fishing quotas also become socially and politically intolerable. We
understand that this is especially relevant to fishing-dependent regions, understand-
ing this category of regions not in the sense of the Hague Preferences formula,
which is limited to Ireland and the UK, but in a genuine sense to include all fishing-
dependent regions of the EU.91 Good examples, although not the only ones, of
regions in this category are Galicia (Spain), Highlands and Islands (UK), N-E
Scotland (UK), Algarve (Portugal), and Peloponnisos (Greece).92
5 Final Considerations
Perhaps much of the frustration that RS has generated over the years in some
states—mainly in states adversely affected like Spain—derives from the misleading
way it has been formulated. The mismatch between the formulation of the RS
concept and the concrete allocation of fishing opportunities among MSs, which has
been applied annually for more than 30 years, has led some to consider that the
concrete allocation constitutes a breach of the RS and hence a breach of EU law.
But despite that RS is formulated as a system based on historical catches that also
takes into account the needs of regions particularly dependent on fisheries, the fact
is that both considerations serve only as a partial explanation of what RS actually
is. As the CJEU has stated, “requirement of relative stability must be understood as
meaning that each Member State is to retain a fixed percentage when fishing
90See art. 39 TFEU. This article sets out the objectives of the common agricultural policy.
However, it should be noted that, as occurs in the art. 38.1 TFEU, references to the common
agricultural policy or to agriculture, and the use of the term “agricultural”, must be understood as
also referring to fisheries.
91See Natale et al. (2013). The authors identify and map specific local communities in which,
given the conditions of accessibility, employment and size of the fishing fleet, the dependence on
fishing activities can be considered particularly relevant, i.e., with ratios above 5%. See also
European Commission, Facts and figures on the Common Fisheries Policy—Basic statistical data
(European Union, Luxembourg, 2014).
92European Parliament (2007) Regional dependency on Fisheries, IP/B/PECH/ST/IC/2006-198;
study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries and carried out by Pavel
Salz and Graeme Macfadyen. E.g. combining income dependency on the fisheries sector and the
number employed, the top five-ranked NUTS-2 regions were Galicia (Spain), Highlands and
Islands (UK), N-E Scotland (UK), Algarve (Portugal) and Peloponnisos (Greece); see table
11, pp. 17–18. About Galicia, see Surı´s-Regueiro and Santiago (2014); also the latest report
published by the Galician Statistics Institute: “Analisis do Sector da Pesca”, 2015, http://www.
ige.eu/estatico/pdfs/s3/publicaciones/AnaliseSectorPesca.pdf.
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opportunities are distributed” and “the distribution formula originally laid down . . .
will continue to apply as long as an amending regulation has not been adopted,”93
which has yet to occur. States have been negotiating the distribution key for years
(mainly in 1983 but also in subsequent acts of accession and whenever it has been
necessary to allocate quotas for new fishing opportunities). It is a fixed percentage,
only altered annually when appropriate by applying the Hague Preferences. There-
fore, in our opinion, the arguments that this allocation key identified as RS is not a
true reflection of historical catches of MSs, or it does not take into account the needs
of all regions particularly dependent on fisheries, probably do not provide a suffi-
cient legal ground for questioning its legality. However, they may be good argu-
ments for negotiation within the framework of a reform process.
One of the effects of RS is discards, i.e., catches returned to the sea. The current
legislation, Regulation 1380/2013, keeps RS as a criterion for allocating fishing
opportunities among MSs but introduces a gradual ban on discards. Aside from the
existing flexibility mechanisms of RS (quota swapping and year-to-year flexibility),
Regulation 1380/2013 establishes some exemptions to the landing obligation (high
survivability, de minimis, prohibited species, and predator-damaged fish), provides
an additional mechanism of flexibility (between species), and allows an increase in
fishing opportunities to take into account the effect of discards.
The challenge is great, especially in certain mixed fisheries where the discard
rate is very high. At this stage at least, it appears that RS could be the loser in the
compromise sought in Regulation 1380/2013 between it and the discard ban.
Exactly to what extent the RS is affected will depend on how insufficient the
regulation’s mechanisms turn out to be and whether any further corrective action
is taken. RS will continue to be the distribution key, but the MSs could not be able
to satisfactorily use their quotas. While national quotas were not being fully used
prior to the ban on discards, mainly due to deficiencies in quota swapping, the
discard ban might not improve this. Although we are still at the implementation
phase, and the real challenge is with the demersal species, the experience with
pelagic species seems to indicate no increase in quota swapping and so far is having
exactly the opposite effect.
From a legal point of view, to what extent is it relevant that MSs cannot fully
exploit their fishing quotas? To answer this question, we need to keep in mind the
objectives of the CFP. The EU has to increase productivity in fisheries by ensuring
the rational development of fisheries production and the optimum utilization of the
factors of production, in particular labor. The EU has to exploit fisheries resources
in such a way that ensures the sustainability of marine ecosystems and also provides
reasonable income to those who depend on fishing activities while taking into
account the interests of consumers. The inability of a state to fully use their fishing
quotas clearly has a negative effect on those who make a living from fishing, and
also on the price and supply. This effect is logically more damaging in fishing-
dependent regions, a category that should be freed from the shackles of the Hague
93Judgments in cases C-87/03 and C-100/03, cit., paragraph 27.
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Preferences, which strips it of its substance by restricting it to regions in two MSs
(Ireland and the UK) while, in its true sense, this category includes many other
regions.
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